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Introduction: Pre-Election Concern, Election Day Relief, Alarming Reality  
 
There was an unprecedented level of concern approaching the 2006 Election (“E2006”) about 
the vulnerability of the vote counting process to manipulation. With questions about the 
integrity of the 2000, 2002 and 2004 elections remaining unresolved, with e-voting having 
proliferated nationwide, and with incidents occurring with regularity through 2005 and 2006, 
the alarm spread from computer experts to the media and the public at large. It would be fair 
to say that America approached E2006 with held breath. 
 
For many observers, the results on Election Day permitted a great sigh of relief—not because 
control of Congress shifted from Republicans to Democrats, but because it appeared that the 
public will had been translated more or less accurately into electoral results, not thwarted as 
some had feared. There was a relieved rush to conclude that the vote counting process had 
been fair and the concerns of election integrity proponents overblown. 
 
Unfortunately the evidence forces us to a very different and disturbing conclusion: there was 
gross vote count manipulation and it had a great impact on the results of E2006, significantly 
decreasing the magnitude of what would have been, accurately tabulated, a landslide of epic 
proportions. Because much of this manipulation appears to have been computer-based, and 
therefore invisible to the legions of at-the-poll observers, the public was informed of the usual 
“isolated incidents and glitches” but remains unaware of the far greater story: The electoral 
machinery and vote counting systems of the United States did not honestly and accurately 
translate the public will and certainly can not be counted on to do so in the future. 
 
 
                                                 
1 Jonathan Simon, JD (http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/jonathan_simon) is Co-founder of Election 
Defense Alliance. Bruce O’Dell (http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/bruce_odell) is EDA Data Analysis 
Coordinator. 
 - 2 -
                                                
The Evidentiary Basis 
 
Our analysis of the distortions introduced into the E2006 vote count relies heavily on the 
official exit polls once again undertaken by Edison Media Research and Mitofsky 
International (“Edison/Mitofsky”) on behalf of a consortium of major media outlets known as 
the National Election Pool (NEP). In presenting exit poll-based evidence of vote count 
corruption, we are all too aware of the campaign that has been waged to discredit the 
reliability of exit polls as a measure of voter intent.  
 
Our analysis is not, however, based on a broad assumption of exit poll reliability. Rather 
we maintain that the national exit poll for E2006 contains within it specific questions 
that serve as intrinsic and objective yardsticks by which the representative validity of the 
poll’s sample can be established, from which our conclusions flow directly.  
 
For the purposes of this analysis our primary attention is directed to the exit poll in which 
respondents were asked for whom they cast their vote for the House of Representatives.2 
Although only four House races (in the single-district states) were polled as individual races, 
an additional nationwide sample of more than 10,000 voters was drawn,3 the results 
representing the aggregate vote for the House in E2006. The sample was weighted according 
to a variety of demographics prior to public posting, and had a margin of error of +/- 1%.4
 
When we compare the results of this national exit poll with the total vote count for all House 
races we find that once again, as in the 2004 Election (“E2004”), there is a very significant 
exit poll-vote count discrepancy. The exit poll indicates a Democratic victory margin 
nearly 4%, or 3 million votes, greater than the margin recorded by the vote counting 
machinery. This is far outside the margin of error of the poll and has less than a one in 10,000 
likelihood of occurring as a matter of chance. 
 
 
The Exit Polls and The Vote Count 
 
In E2004 the only nontrivial argument against the validity of the exit polls—other than the 
mere assumption that the vote counts must be correct—turned out to be the hypothesis, never 
supported by evidence, that Republicans had been more reluctant to respond and that therefore 
Democrats were "oversampled." And now, in E2006, the claim has once again been made that 
 
2 Edison/Mitofsky exit polls for the Senate races also present alarming discrepancies and will be treated in a 
separate paper. The special significance of the House vote is that, unlike the Senate vote, it offers a nationwide 
aggregate view. 
3 The sample size was roughly equal to that used to measure the national popular vote in presidential elections. 
At-precinct interviews were supplemented by phone interviews where needed to sample early and absentee 
voters. 
4 We note with interest and raised brows that the NEP is now giving the MOE for their national sample as +/-3% 
http://www.exit-poll.net/faq.html#a15 . This is rather curious, as their published Methods Statement in 2004 
assigns to a sample of the same size and mode of sampling the expected MOE of +/-1% (see Appendix 2 for both 
NEP Statements). Perhaps the NEP intends its new methodology statement to apply to its anticipated effort in 
2008 and is planning to reduce the national sample size by 75% for that election; we hope not. It of course makes 
no sense, as applied to E2004 or E2006, that state polls in the 2000-respondent range should yield a MOE of +/-
4%, as stated, while a national poll of more than five times that sample size should come in at +/-3%. It would 
certainly be useful in quelling any controversy that has arisen or might arise from exit poll-vote count disparities 
far outside the poll’s MOE, but it is, to our knowledge, not the way that statistics and mathematics work. 
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the Exit Polls were "off" because Democrats were oversampled.5 Indeed this claim of 
sampling bias is by now accepted with something of a “so what else is new?” shrug. The 2006 
Exit Poll, however, contains intrinsic yardsticks that directly refute this familiar and 
convenient claim. But before turning to the yardstick questions themselves, we need to clarify 
certain aspects of exit polling data presentation that have often proven confusing.  
 
Any informed discussion of exit polling must distinguish among three separate categories of 
data:  
 
1) “Raw” data, which comprises the actual responses to the questionnaires simply tallied 
up; this data is never publicly released and, in any case, makes no claim to accurately 
represent the electorate and can not be usefully compared with vote counts. 
2) “Weighted” data, in which the raw data has been weighted or stratified on the basis 
of numerous demographic and voting pattern variables to reflect with great accuracy 
the composition and characteristics of the electorate. 
3) “Forced” or “Adjusted” data, in which the pollster overrides previous weighting in 
order to make the "Who did you vote for?" result in a given race match the vote count 
for that race, however it distorts the demographics of the sample (that's why they call it 
"forcing"). 
 
Because the NEP envisions the post-election purpose of its exit polls as being limited to 
facilitating academic dissection of the election’s dynamics and demographics (e.g., “How did 
the 18-25 age group vote?” or “How did voters especially concerned with the economy 
vote?”), the NEP methodology calls for “correcting” or "adjusting" its exit polls to congruence 
with the actual vote percentages after the polls close and actual returns become available.  Exit 
polls are "corrected" on the ironclad assumption that the vote counts are valid. This becomes 
the supreme truth, relative to which all else is measured, and therefore it is assumed that polls 
that match these vote counts will present the most accurate information about the 
demographics and voting patterns of the electorate. A distorted electorate in the adjusted poll 
is therefore a powerful indicator of an invalid vote count. 
 
We examined both “weighted” and “adjusted” exit polls of nationwide vote for the House of 
Representatives published by the NEP. On Election Night, November 7, 2006 at 7:07 p.m., 
CNN.com posted a national exit poll that was demographically weighted but not yet adjusted 
to congruence with the vote counts.6 We call this the Weighted National Poll. At various 
intervals over the next 18 hours, as polls closed and official tabulations became available, the 
results presented in the Weighted National Poll were progressively “corrected” to match the 
official vote totals, culminating in a fully adjusted national exit poll posted on CNN.com at 1 
 
5 See for example David Bauder, AP, in a November 8 article at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/11/08/AR2006110800403.html . Oddly enough, “oversampling” of Democrats has 
become a chronic ailment of exit polls since the proliferation of e-voting, no matter how diligently the 
nonpartisan collection of experts at the peak of their profession strives to prevent it. Of course the weighting 
process itself is undertaken to bring the sample into close conformity with the known and estimated 
characteristics of the electorate, including partisanship; so the fact that more of a given party’s adherents were 
actually sampled, while it would be reflected in the unpublished raw data, would not in fact bias or affect the 
validity of the published weighted poll. That is the whole point of weighting, in light of which the hand-wringing 
about Democratic oversampling strikes us as misunderstanding at best, and quite possibly intended misdirection. 
6 The 7:07 p.m. poll reported a 10,207 sample size and, in accordance with NEP methodology, the raw data had 
been weighted to closely match the demographics of the electorate. 
p.m. November 8, 2006. We call this the Adjusted National Poll. We will make reference to 
both polls in the analysis that follows. 
 
The 2006 national vote for the House, as captured by the Weighted National Poll, was 55.0% 
Democratic and 43.5% Republican—an 11.5% Democratic margin. By 1:00 p.m. on 
November 8, the Adjusted National Poll reported the overall vote for the House as 52.6% 
Democratic and 45.0% Republican, just a 7.6% margin.7  This 7.6% Democratic margin of 
course matched the tabulated vote count but was 3.9% smaller than that recorded by the 
Weighted National Poll the night before. This was a net difference of 3 million votes fewer for 
the Democrats. 
 
 
Did The 2006 Exit Poll Oversample Democrats? Cross-tabs Answer This Question 
 
The national exit poll administered by Edison/Mitofsky for the NEP is not, as some may 
imagine, a simple “Who did you vote for?” questionnaire. It poses some 40 to 50 additional 
questions pertaining to demographic, political preference, and state-of-mind variables. Voters 
are asked, for example, about such characteristics as race, gender, income, age, and also about 
such things as church attendance, party identification, ideology, approval of various public 
figures, importance of various issues to their vote, and when they made up their minds about 
whom to vote for.  
 
When the poll is posted, these characteristics are presented in a format, known as “cross-tabs,” 
in which the voting choice of respondents in each subgroup is shown. For example, 
respondents were asked whether they thought the United States “is going in the right 
direction.” In the Weighted National Poll the cross-tab for this characteristic (see below) 
shows us that 40% said Yes and 56% said No; and further that, of the 40% subgroup who said 
Yes, 21% voted Democrat and 78% voted Republican for House of Representatives, while, of 
the 56% who said No, 80% voted Democrat and 18% voted Republican. We also see that this 
question is quite highly correlated with voting preference, with fully four-fifths of the 
“pessimists” voting Democratic. 
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7 Analysts noticing the substantial increase in “respondents” between the Weighted (10,207) and Adjusted 
(13,251) National Polls may understandably but erroneously conclude that the shift between the two polls is the 
result of a late influx of Republican-leaning respondents. This is not the way it works. Since these are both 
weighted polls, each is in effect “tuned” to a profile of the electorate assumed to be valid—the Weighted 
National Poll to a set of established demographic variables and the Adjusted National Poll to the vote count once 
it is tabulated. The published number of respondents is irrelevant to this process and has significance only as a 
guide to the poll’s margin of error. 10,000+ respondents is a huge sample (cf. the 500 – 1500 range of most 
tracking polls), and obviously an ample basis on which to perform the demographic weighting manifest in the 
Weighted National Poll. 
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Cross-tabs vary greatly in the degree to which the characteristic is correlated with voting 
preference. The more strongly correlated, the more important the cross-tab becomes in 
assessing the poll’s validity as an indicator of the vote. 
 
Prior to public posting the exit poll data is weighted according to a variety of demographics, in 
such a way that the resulting cross-tabs closely mirror the expected, independently measurable 
characteristics of the electorate as a whole. The cross-tabs, in turn, tell us about the sample, 
giving us detailed information about its composition and representativeness. This information 
is of critical importance to our analysis because among the many questions asked of 
respondents there are several that enable us to tell whether the sample is valid or politically 
biased in one direction or another. These are the “intrinsic yardsticks” to which we have made 
reference. 
 
Among the most salient yardstick questions were the following: 
 
• Job Approval of President Bush 
• Job Approval of Congress 
• Vote for President in 2004 
 
With respect to each of these yardsticks the composition of the sample can be compared to 
measures taken of the voting population as a whole, giving us a very good indication of the 
validity of the sample. Examining these cross-tabs for the Weighted National Poll—the 7:07 
p.m. poll that was written off by the media as a “typical oversampling of Democrats”—this is 
what we found: 
 
• Approval of President Bush:   42% 
• Approval of Congress:   36% 
• Vote for President in 2004:   Bush 47%, Kerry 45% 
 
When we compare these numbers with what we know about the electorate as a whole going 
into E2006, we can see at once that the poll that told us that the Democratic margin was 3 
million votes greater than the computers toted up was not by any stretch of the imagination an 
oversampling of Democrats. Let’s take each yardstick in turn. 
 
Presidential Approval Rating  
 
We can compare the 42% approval of President Bush in the Weighted National Poll with any 
or all of the host of tracking polls measuring this critical political variable in the weeks and 
days leading up to the election. It is important when comparing approval ratings to make sure 
that we compare apples with apples, since the question can be posed in different ways leading 
to predictably different results. The principal formats of the approval measure are either 
simply “Do you approve or disapprove. . .?” or “Do you strongly approve, somewhat approve, 
somewhat disapprove, or strongly disapprove. . .?” We can call these the two-point and four-
point formats respectively. By repeatedly posing the question in both formats on the same 
days, it has been determined that the four-point format consistently yields an approval rating 
3-4% higher than the two-point format.8
 
Bearing this in mind and comparing the Weighted National Poll respondents’ approval of 
President Bush with that registered by the electorate going into the election, we find very 
close parity. PollingReport.com catalogues 33 national polls of Presidential approval taken 
between October 1 and Election Day using the two-point format, with an average (mean) 
approval rating of 37.6%.9 This translates to a 41% approval rating in the four-point format 
used for the Weighted National Poll. A direct comparison is also possible with the Rasmussen 
tracking poll, which unlike the other tracking polls uses the four-point format. The Rasmussen 
approval rating for October 2006 is also 41%, with 57% disapproving.10 Thus, the 42% 
approval of President Bush in the Weighted National Poll matches the figure established for 
the electorate as a whole going into the election; in fact it is 1% “over par.” As Bush approval 
correlates very strongly with voting preference (see below), an oversampling of Democrats 
would unavoidably have been reflected in a lower rating. The rating at or above the 
established level thus provides the first confirmation of the validity of the Weighted National 
Poll. 
 
 
 
Congressional Approval Rating 
 
As with the Presidential approval yardstick, comparison between the 36% of the Weighted 
National Poll sample that approved of how Congress was handling its job and the value 
established for the electorate in numerous tracking polls corroborates the Weighted National 
Poll’s validity. The mean of the 17 national polls catalogued by the PollingReport.com 
measuring approval of Congress between October 1 and Election Day (all employing the two-
point format) was 27.5% approval.11 Translating to the four-point format used for the exit poll 
yields a comparable approval rating of 31%, a full 5% below the Congressional approval 
given by the Weighted National Poll respondents. As with the Presidential rating, approval of 
what was at that point a Republican Congress correlates strongly with voting preference (see 
below). We would have expected an oversampling of Democrats to give a lower approval 
rating to Congress than did the electorate it was supposedly misrepresenting. Instead the 
                                                 
8 http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/polling_methodology_job_approval_ratings As 
Rasmussen notes, the 3-4% upwards adjustment in the four-point format impounds the virtual elimination of the 
“Not Sure” response obtained with greater frequency in the two-point format. 
9 http://www.pollingreport.com/BushJob.htm Typical of the national polls included are Gallup, AP-Ipsos, 
Newsweek, Fox/Opinion Dynamics, CBS/New York Times, NBC/Wall Street Journal, and ABC/Washington 
Post. The median approval rating is 37.4%, indistinguishable from the mean, and there is no discernible trend up 
or down over the Oct.1 – Nov. 7 period. 
10 http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/political_updates/president_bush_job_approval The 
rating combines “strong” and “somewhat” approve and is the average of Rasmussen’s daily tracking polls 
conducted throughout the month. 
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11 http://www.pollingreport.com/CongJob.htm  
Weighted National Poll yielded a significantly higher Congressional approval rating—
indicative, if anything, of an oversampling of Republicans. 
 
 
 
Vote for President in 2004 
 
Edison/Mitofksy asked all respondents how they had voted in the 2004 Presidential election. 
The Weighted National Poll sample included 45% who said they had voted for Kerry and 47% 
who said they had voted for Bush (8% indicating they had not voted or voted for another 
candidate). This Bush margin of +2% closely approximates the +2.8% margin that Bush 
enjoyed in the official popular vote count for E2004.  
 
 
 
While poll respondents have often shown some tendency to indicate they voted for the sitting 
president when questioned at the time of the next presidential election (i.e., four years out), 
Bush’s historically low approval rating, coupled with his high relevance to this off-year 
election, and the shorter time span since the vote in question, make such a generic “winner’s 
shift” singularly unlikely in E2006. 
 
And while we present the reported 2.8% Bush margin in 2004 at face value, it will not escape 
notice that the distortions in vote tabulation that we establish in the current paper were also 
alleged in 2004, were evidenced by the 2004 exit polls, and were demonstrably achievable 
given the electronic voting systems deployed at that time. We note that, if upon retrospective 
evaluation the unadjusted 2004 exit polls prove as accurate as the 2006 exit polls appear to be, 
and their 2.5% margin for Kerry in 2004 is taken as the appropriate baseline, a correctly 
weighted sample in 2006 would have included even more Kerry voters and even fewer Bush 
voters than Edison/Mitofsky’s Weighted National Poll, with a substantial consequent up-tick 
in the Democratic margin beyond the 3 million votes thus far unaccounted for. 
 
These critical comparisons between measures taken of the Weighted National Poll sample and 
established benchmarks are presented together in the chart immediately below. 
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There should be little question that the three yardsticks presented above conclusively refute 
the glib canard that the National Exit Poll disparity was due to an oversampling of Democrats. 
Two additional cross-tabs are, however, worthy of note in this regard: Vote By Race and Vote 
By Party ID.  
 
Vote By Race 
 
The Weighted National Poll sample, as can be seen below, is 80% White, 10% African-
American, and 8% Latino in composition, with Whites splitting their vote evenly between the 
parties while Latinos and particularly Blacks voted overwhelmingly Democratic. 
 
 
 
 
We can compare these demographics with an established measure of the electorate published 
by the University of Michigan Center for Political Studies. The ANES Guide To Public 
Opinion and Electoral Behavior, is a longitudinal study of many aspects of the American 
electorate, including racial composition.12  The chart below presents the ANES results for the 
past six biennial national elections.13
 
                                                 
12 The American National Election Studies; see www.electionstudies.org.  Produced and distributed by the 
University of Michigan, Center for Political Studies; based on work supported by the National Science 
Foundation and a number of other sponsors. 
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13 The full chart, dating to 1948, may be referenced at 
http://www.electionstudies.org/nesguide/toptable/tab1a_3.htm  
   
 
 
As can be seen by comparing the charts above, in none of the past six elections was the 
White participation as high or the Black participation as low as represented in the 
Weighted National Poll.14 The average White proportion of the electorate was 74%, 6% 
below the exit poll’s representation of Whites, while the average Black proportion was 13%, 
3% above the exit poll’s representation of Blacks. The relative under-representation of every 
strong Democratic constituency in this cross-tab, in favor of the least Democratic voting bloc, 
hardly jibes with the “Invalid: Oversampled Democrats” label cheerfully pasted on the 
Weighted National Poll. 
 
Vote By Party ID 
 
Though Vote By Party ID generally fluctuates relatively modestly from one election to the 
next, it is, not surprisingly, nonetheless sensitive to the dynamics of atypical turnout battles. 
While we will address the E2006 turnout dynamics more fully in a later section, for the 
present we will simply note that a Democratic turnout romp was generally acknowledged in 
2006, Republican voters having a number of late-breaking reasons for staying home.  
 
In the Weighted National Poll, Democratic voters comprised 39% of the sample to 35% for 
the Republicans, as shown below. 
 
 
 
Only 20 states register their voters by party so there is no direct comparison to be made to 
actual registration figures. But the ANES Guide once again proves useful. The chart below 
                                                 
 - 9 -
14 Asian and Native American voters, also strong Democratic constituencies, likewise seem to be significantly 
under-represented in the Weighted National Poll. The ANES results for 2006 are due to be published later this 
year. In E2004 the Weighted National Poll was 77% White and 11% Black, as opposed to the ANES proportions 
of 70% and 16% respectively. It was this disproportionately White sample—supposedly short on “reluctant” 
Bush responders, but in reality overstocked with White voters who favored Bush by a margin of 11% and 
understocked with Black voters who favored Kerry by a margin of 80%!—that gave Kerry a 2.5% victory in the 
nationwide popular vote. 
records party identification amongst the electorate as a whole on a seven-point scale, but the 
comparison is convincing.15
 
  
 
In each of the past six biennial national elections through 2004, self-identified Democrats 
have outnumbered Republicans. The margins for 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2004 
have been +4%, +10%, +11%, +10%, +4%, and +5% respectively. If Independent leaners are 
included, the Democratic margin increases every year, to +5%, +12%, +14%, +12%, +6%, 
and +10% respectively. These are very consistent numbers confirming a consistent plurality of 
self-identified Democratic voters from election to election.16  The 4% Democratic plurality in 
the Weighted National Poll sample is seen to be at the extreme low end of the margins 
recorded since 1994, matching only the 4% Democratic margins recorded in the major 
Republican victories of 1994 and 2002. But E2006 was a major Democratic victory and, as 
will be seen, a likely turnout landslide.  
 
While it would probably insult the intelligence of the media analysts who proclaimed that the 
E2006 Weighted National Poll was “off” because it had oversampled Democrats to even 
suggest the possibility that one or more of them took the 39% - 35% Democratic ID margin in 
the poll to be indicative of Democratic oversampling—such misinterpretation quickly 
spreading among, and taking on the full authority of, the Election Night punditry—it is very 
difficult to comprehend by what other measure the Election Night analysts, and all who 
followed their lead, might have reached that manifestly erroneous, though obviously 
comforting, conclusion. 
 
In short, there is no measure anywhere in the Weighted National Poll—in which the 
Democratic margin nationwide was some 3 million votes greater than tabulated by the 
                                                 
15 The full chart, dating to 1952, may be referenced at 
http://www.electionstudies.org/nesguide/toptable/tab2a_1.htm  
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16 It is worth noting that among the most suspicious demographic distortions of the Adjusted National Poll in 
E2004 was the Party ID cross-tab which indicated an electorate evenly divided between self-identified Democrats 
and Republicans, at 37% apiece. Not only was this supposed parity unprecedented, but it flew in the face of near-
universal observational indications of a major Democratic turnout victory in 2004: not only in Ohio but 
nationwide, long lines and hours-long waits were recorded at inner-city and traditionally Democratic precincts, 
while literally no such lines were observed and no such complaints recorded in traditionally Republican voting 
areas (see EIRS data at https://voteprotect.org/index.php?display=EIRMapNation&tab=ED04).  
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machines—that indicates an oversampling of Democrats.  Any departures from norms, 
trends, and expectations indicate just the opposite: a poll that likely undersampled 
Democratic voters and so, at 11.5%, understated the Democratic victory margin. 
 
 
The Adjusted National Poll: Making The Vote-Count Match 
 
In the wake of our primary analysis of the validity of the Weighted National Poll, 
consideration of the Adjusted National Poll is something of an afterthought, though it does 
serve to further reinforce our conclusions. 
 
As we described earlier, in the “adjusted” or “corrected” poll the pollster overrides all 
previous weighting to make the “Who did you vote for?” result in a given race (or set of races) 
match the vote count for that race, however it distorts the demographics of the sample. In the 
Adjusted National Poll, which appeared the day after the election and remains posted (with a 
few further updates not affecting this analysis) on the CNN.com website, Edison/Mitofsky 
was faced with the task of matching the tabulated aggregate results for the set of House races 
nationwide. This translated to reducing the Democratic margin from 11.5% to 7.6% by giving 
less weight to the respondents who said they had voted for a Democratic candidate and more 
weight to the respondents who said they had voted Republican. Of course this process, 
referred to as “forcing,” also affects the response to every question on the questionnaire, 
including the demographic and political preference questions we have been considering.  
 
The most significant effect was upon “Vote for President in 2004.” In order to match the 
results of the official tally, the Adjusted National Poll was forced to depict an electorate that 
voted for Bush over Kerry by a 6% margin in 2004, more than twice the “actual” margin of 
2.8%, taken charitably at face value for the purposes of this analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
As might be expected, other yardsticks were also affected: Bush approval increases to 43%; 
Congressional approval to 37%; and Party ID shifts to an implausible 38% Democratic, 36% 
Republican. 
 
There were, as we identified earlier, indications that the Weighted National Poll itself may 
have undersampled voters who cast their votes for the Democratic House candidates.17 The 
Adjusted National Poll compounds such distortions in order to present an electorate cut to fit 
the official vote totals. If such an adjusted poll yields inaccurate and distorted information 
 
17 To the extent that weighting is based on prior turnout patterns, a significant shift in the turnout dynamic, as 
was apparent in E2006, would be one cause for this undersampling. A second and more disturbing cause: 
“actual” results from recent elections, which themselves have been vulnerable to and distorted by electronic 
mistabulation, fed into the weighting algorithms. 
about the demographics and voting patterns of the electorate, then very basic logic tells us that 
the vote count it was forced to match is itself invalid. This of course corroborates the story 
told by the Weighted National Poll, as well as by the pre-election polls, as shown in the graph 
below. 18
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See Appendix 1 for detailed tabular presentation of the above data. 
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18 The 11.5% Democratic margin in the Weighted National Poll was strictly congruent with the 11.5% average 
margin of the seven major national public opinion polls conducted immediately prior to the election. Indeed, this 
11.5% pre-election margin was drawn down substantially by the appearance of three election-week “outlier” 
polls, which strangely came in at 7%, 6%, and 4% respectively. To put this in perspective, excluding these three 
polls, 30 of the 31 other major national polls published from the beginning of October up to the election showed 
the Democratic margin to be in double-digits, and the single exception came in at 9%.   
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2006/house/us/generic_congressional_ballot-22.html. It is also worth 
noting that most pre-election polls shift, in the month before the election, to a "likely-voter cutoff model" 
(LCVM) that excludes entirely any voters not highly likely (on the basis of a battery of screening questions) to 
cast ballots; that is, it excludes entirely voters with a 25% or even 50% likelihood of voting. Since these are 
disproportionately transients and first-time voters, the less educated and affluent, it is also a correspondingly 
Democratic constituency that is disproportionately excluded. Ideally these voters should be down-weighted to 
their estimated probability of voting, but that probability is not 0%. By excluding them entirely, these pre-
election polls build in a pro-Republican bias of about 2-5%, which anomalously in 2006 appears to have been 
offset by the significantly greater enthusiasm for voting on the part of the Democrats, reflected in an elevated 
LCVM failure rate among Republicans responding negatively or ambivalently to the battery question about their 
intention to vote in E2006. Dr.  Steven Freeman, visiting professor at the University of Pennsylvania’s Center for 
Organizational Dynamics, has examined this phenomenon in great detail. Of course, one of the reasons for the 
recent shift to the LVCM—a methodology that pollsters will generally admit is distorted but which they maintain 
nonetheless “gets it right”—is that pollsters are not paid for methodological purity, they are paid to get it right. 
From the pollster’s standpoint, getting it right is the measure of their success whether the election is honest or the 
fix is in. The reality is that distorted vote counts and a distorted but “successful” pre-election polling 
methodology  wind up corroborating and validating each other, with only the exit polls (drawn from actual 
voters) seeming out of step.
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Plausible Explanations? 
 
Since, as we have seen, the Weighted National Poll’s inclusion of Democratic voters (or, 
better put, voters with characteristics making them likely to vote Democratic) either jibes with 
or falls somewhat short of established benchmarks for the electorate, there are only two 
possible explanations for the dramatic disparity between it and the official vote count: either 
Republicans unexpectedly turned out in droves and routed the Democrats in the E2006 turnout 
battle, or the official vote count is dramatically “off.” 
 
To our knowledge no one has contended the former. With good reason: there are a plethora of 
measures, including individual precinct tallies and additional polling data that we will 
examine in the next section, that confirm the obvious—the Democrats were the runaway 
winners of the 2006 Get-Out-The-Vote battle. Indeed it is generally acknowledged that 
Republican voters stayed home in droves, dismayed and turned-off by the late-breaking run of 
scandals, bad news, and missteps.19
 
Hence it must be the reported nationwide vote tally which is inaccurate. Although this is, to 
put it mildly, an unwelcome finding, it is unfortunately consonant with the many specific 
incidents of vote-switching and mistabulation reported in 2006, with an apparent competitive-
contest targeting pattern,20 and with a host of other evidence and analysis that has emerged 
about electronic voting technology as deployed in the United States. 
 
 
So Why Did The Republicans Lose? 
 
It will no doubt be objected that if such substantial manipulation of the vote counts is 
possible, why would it stop short of bringing about a general electoral victory? While we 
would naturally like to credit the heightened scrutiny engendered by the untiring efforts of 
election integrity groups, an awakening media, and a more informed and vigilant public; an 
alternative, more chilling, explanation has emerged—simply that the mechanics of 
manipulation (software modules, primarily; see Appendix 3) had to be deployed before late-
breaking pre-election developments21 greatly expanded the gap that such manipulation would 
have been calibrated to cover.  
 
To quantify the extraordinary effect of the various “October surprises,” we reference below 
the Cook Political Report National Tracking Poll’s Generic Congressional Ballot, ordinarily a 
rather stable measure:22  
 
 
19 Indeed, once on-going analysis fully quantifies the extent of the Democrats’ turnout victory, it will be time to 
recalculate upward the magnitude of the vote miscount in 2006. 
20 Our paper on competitive contest targeting is scheduled for publication in August 2007. 
21 The powerful impact of the succession of lurid scandals (Foley, Haggard, Sherwood, et al) is clear from the 
Weighted National Poll responses in which voters were asked about the importance of “corruption/ethics:” 41% 
responded “extremely important” and another 33% “very important,” the highest response of all the 
“importance” questions, outstripping even the importance of “terrorism.” Iraq, another source of late-breaking 
negatives for the GOP, also scored high on the importance scale (36% extremely, with this category breaking for 
the Democrats 61% -38%). 
22 http://www.cookpolitical.com/poll/ballot.php.  
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GENERIC CONGRESSIONAL BALLOT 
(Most Likely Voters) 
Date This Poll 
Sample Size/MoE 807/3.5% 
MLV Dem Rep 
Oct. 26-29 61 35 
Oct. 19-22 57 35 
Oct. 5-8 50 41 
Sept. 27-30 51 35 
Sept. 21-24 49 41 
 
 
Thus the Democratic margin among most likely voters increased from 9% (50% - 41%) 
to 26% (61% - 35%) during the month of October, an enormous 17% jump occurring 
after the vote-shifting mechanisms were, or could be, deployed. 
 
It should be noted that among the various tracking polls, there were some that did not pick up 
the dramatic trend reflected in the Cook poll. Indeed, Cook’s own parallel tracking poll of all 
registered voters (not screened for likelihood of turnout) found only a modest gain of 2% in 
the Democratic margin over the same period. This is indicative of the phenomenon to which 
we have already made reference: what most boosted the Democrats during the month of 
October was an extraordinary gain in the relative motivation and likelihood of turning out 
among their voters. It supports our belief that it was primarily the exceptional turnout 
differential, understandably missed by exit polls calibrated to historical turnout patterns, that 
would have given the Democrats an even greater victory than the 11.5% reflected by the 
Weighted National Poll, in an honestly and accurately counted election. 
 
 
Implications 
 
The 2006 Election gave the Democrats control of both houses of Congress, by margins of 31 
seats (233 – 202) in the House and two seats (51 – 49) in the Senate. The Democrats won 20 
House races and four Senate races by margins of 6% of the vote or less.23 The odds are very 
good that the outcomes of most if not all of these races would have been reversed a month 
earlier, post-deployment of vote shifting mechanisms but pre-October surprises, before the 
resulting dramatic movement to the Democrats as reflected in the 17% Generic Ballot jump. 
The ballpark sans-October Surprise numbers: 222R – 213D in the House and 53R – 47D in 
the Senate.  
 
Absent a very Blue October, which came too late to be countered by deployment of 
additional vote-shifting mechanisms, we can conclude that, with the assistance of the vote-
                                                 
23 In the House: four races by 1%, four races by 2%, one race by 3%, 5 races by 4%, one race by 5%, five races 
by 6%, one race by 7%, five races by 8%, two races by 9%; in the Senate: two races by 1%, one race by 3%, one 
race by 6%, one race by 8%. 
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shifting mechanisms already deployed, the Republicans would almost certainly have 
maintained control of both houses of Congress.  
 
This should be a rather sobering observation for Democrats looking ahead to their 
electoral future and assessing to what extent the system is broken as they contemplate 
the various legislative proposals for reform.24
 
 
Conclusion 
 
There is a remarkable degree of consensus among computer scientists,25 security 
professionals,26 government agencies,27 and independent analysts28 that U.S. electronic vote 
tallying technology is vulnerable both to unintentional programming errors29 and to deliberate 
manipulation—certainly by foul-play-minded insiders at voting equipment vendors, but also 
by other individuals with access to voting equipment hardware or software.30  
 
We have arrived at a system of “faith-based” voting where we are simply asked to trust the 
integrity of the count produced by the secret-software machines that tally our votes, without 
effective check mechanisms.  In the context of yet another election replete with reported 
problems with vote tallying,31 the continuing mismatch between the preferences expressed by 
voters as captured in national exit polls and the official vote tally as reported to the public is 
beyond disturbing. It is a bright red flag that no one who values a democratic America can in 
good conscience ignore. 
  
False elections bequeath to all Americans—right, left, and center—nothing less sinister than 
an illusory identity and the living of a national lie. Our biennial elections, far more than the 
endless parade of opinion polls, define America—both in terms of who occupies its seats of 
power and as the single snapshot that becomes the enduring national self-portrait that all 
Americans carry in their mental wallets for at least the biennium and more often for an era. It 
is also, needless to say, the portrait we send abroad. 
 
While the reported results of the 2006 election were certainly well-received by the Democratic 
party and were ballpark-consistent with public expectations of a Democratic victory, the 
unadjusted 2006 exit poll data indicates that what has been cast as a typical midterm setback 
 
24 If we are correct in our assessment that the limitations on vote shifting were more temporal than spatial—that 
is, had more to do with timing of deployment than with the potential size of the shift—then only extraordinary 
and unanticipated eleventh-hour pre-election surges a la E2006 will suffice to overcome future foul play. 
However, whatever quantitative limits may apply to electronic vote shifting, it should obviously not be 
necessary to enjoy super-majority support in order to eke out electoral victories. 
25 For instance  http://www.acm.org/usacm/weblog/index.php?cat=6  
26 See the credentials of the interdisciplinary Brennan Center Task Force membership at 
http://brennancenter.org/programs/downloads/About%20the%20Task%20Force.pdf  
27 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05956.pdf  
28 See http://www.blackboxvoting.org/BBVtsxstudy.pdf , http://www.blackboxvoting.org/BBVtsxstudy-supp.pdf 
, and http://www.blackboxvoting.org/BBVreport.pdf  
29 Credible reports of voting equipment malfunctions are all too common; one good starting point is 
http://www.votersunite.org/info/messupsbyvendor.asp  
30 For example http://brennancenter.org/programs/downloads/SecurityFull7-3Reduced.pdf
31 Election 2006 incidents at http://www.votersunite.org/electionproblems.asp  
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for a struggling president in his second term was something rather more remarkable – a 
landslide repudiation of historic proportions.  
 
We believe that the demographic validity of the Weighted National Poll in 2006 is the clearest 
possible warning that the ever-growing catalog of reported vulnerabilities in America’s 
electronic vote counting systems are not only possible to exploit, they are actually being 
exploited. To those who would rush to find “innocent” explanations on an ad hoc basis for the 
cascade of mathematical evidence that continues to emerge, we ask what purpose is served 
and what comfort is given by relying on a series of implausible alibis to dispel concerns and 
head off effective reform? 
 
The vulnerability is manifest; the stakes are enormous; the incentive is obvious; the evidence 
is strong and persistent. Any system so clearly at risk of interference and gross manipulation 
can not and must not be trusted to tally the votes in any future elections. 
 
*    *    * 
Appendix 1 – US House Exit Poll Data 
 
1. National Generic US House Exit Poll summary 
 
US House Exit Poll 2006
Opinion Poll 
(average)
Unadjusted Exit 
Poll
Adjusted Exit 
Poll
Reported 
Actual %
Reported 
Actual Vote
Nov 1 - 5 Nov 7 Nov 8 Nov 9 Nov 9
7:07 PM EST 1:00 PM EST
7 polls** Sample size Sample size
10,207 13,251
Total Democrat vote for US House* 55.0% 55.0% 52.6% 52.7% 40,323,525
Total Republican vote for US House 43.5% 43.5% 45.0% 45.1% 34,565,872
Total Other Parties vote for US House 1.5% 2.4% 2.2% 1,694,392
Total US House 76,583,789
*CBSnews.com, 11/9/06 + additional sources for 
unopposed candidates
Democrat - Republican spread (%) 11.5% 11.5% 7.6% 7.6%
Variance: Exit Poll - Actual [%] 3.9% 3.9% 0.0%
Democrat - Republican spread (count) 8,807,136 5,820,368 5,820,368
Variance: Exit Poll - Actual (count) 2,986,768 0
Variance from actual
Democrat 2.3% 2.3% -0.1%
Republican -1.6% -1.6% -0.1%
Other -2.2% -0.7% 0.2%
**Fox News, CNN, USA Today/Gallup, ABC News/Wash 
Post, Pew Research, Newsweek, Time as reported on 
RealClearPolitics.com  
 
 
2. Exit Poll Screen Captures 
 
Exit poll screen capture files will be posted at 
http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/ExitPollData after the release of this report. 
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3. US House – preliminary reported tallies by state as-of 11/09/2006, CBSNews.com 
 
 
State US House - D US House - R US House - 
Other 
Dem % Rep %  Other % 
AL 224,350 351,650 3,396 38.7% 60.7% 0.6% 
AK 81,408 115,062 6,236 40.2% 56.8% 3.1% 
AZ 478,573 576,061 72,435 42.5% 51.1% 6.4% 
AR 448,058 299,496 0 59.9% 40.1% 0.0% 
CA 3,549,128 2,478,884 207,821 56.9% 39.8% 3.3% 
CO 727,914 571,699 70,877 53.1% 41.7% 5.2% 
CT 652,025 420,995 6,087 60.4% 39.0% 0.6% 
DE 196,700 291,052 20,674 38.7% 57.2% 4.1% 
FL 1,496,686 2,162,353 68,197 40.2% 58.0% 1.8% 
GA 798,809 1,117,086 0 41.7% 58.3% 0.0% 
HI 219,588 118,075 0 65.0% 35.0% 0.0% 
ID 172,530 243,062 19,401 39.7% 55.9% 4.5% 
IL 1,732,380 1,381,232 13,602 55.4% 44.2% 0.4% 
IN 802,751 820,569 22,128 48.8% 49.9% 1.3% 
IA 489,508 519,796 17,629 47.7% 50.6% 1.7% 
KS 360,356 449,548 16,213 43.6% 54.4% 2.0% 
KY 596,402 608,771 39,362 47.9% 48.9% 3.2% 
LA 294,100 579,514 27,028 32.7% 64.3% 3.0% 
ME 344,870 161,335 22,689 65.2% 30.5% 4.3% 
MD 827,674 475,065 41,292 61.6% 35.3% 3.1% 
MA 792,619 197,722 76,951 74.3% 18.5% 7.2% 
MI 1,793,200 1,626,459 97,334 51.0% 46.2% 2.8% 
MN 1,153,624 925,500 99,493 53.0% 42.5% 4.6% 
MS 251,027 295,184 35,077 43.2% 50.8% 6.0% 
MO 965,390 1,031,489 54,436 47.1% 50.3% 2.7% 
MT 314,998 476,062 15,494 39.1% 59.0% 1.9% 
NE 257,214 329,003 0 43.9% 56.1% 0.0% 
NV 286,761 259,237 26,535 50.1% 45.3% 4.6% 
NH 209,424 188,774 3,777 52.1% 47.0% 0.9% 
NJ 948,740 885,007 25,070 51.0% 47.6% 1.3% 
NM 304,058 241,202 0 55.8% 44.2% 0.0% 
NY 2,285,026 1,268,408 8,251 64.2% 35.6% 0.2% 
NC 935,490 907,236 0 50.8% 49.2% 0.0% 
ND 284,242 148,728 0 65.6% 34.4% 0.0% 
OH 1,970,118 1,784,993 8,052 52.4% 47.4% 0.2% 
OK 372,822 517,948 14,278 41.2% 57.2% 1.6% 
OR 713,441 522,846 28,446 56.4% 41.3% 2.2% 
PA 2,060,969 1,705,435 48,949 54.0% 44.7% 1.3% 
RI 264,101 41,753 66,176 71.0% 11.2% 17.8% 
SC 466,473 592,639 13,252 43.5% 55.3% 1.2% 
SD 460,946 195,736 10,470 69.1% 29.3% 1.6% 
TN 860,025 797,431 54,970 50.2% 46.6% 3.2% 
TX 1,783,304 2,069,491 142,391 44.6% 51.8% 3.6% 
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State US House - D US House - R US House - 
Other 
Dem % Rep %  Other % 
UT 234,024 282,554 31,583 42.7% 51.5% 5.8% 
VT 279,170 234,442 11,110 53.2% 44.7% 2.1% 
VA 810,365 1,220,073 117,870 37.7% 56.8% 5.5% 
WA 802,873 498,872 6,584 61.4% 38.1% 0.5% 
WV 258,438 187,895 0 57.9% 42.1% 0.0% 
WI 1,001,254 836,054 15,311 54.0% 45.1% 0.8% 
WY 184,454 186,394 7,465 48.8% 49.3% 2.0% 
       
Subtotal 37,798,400 34,195,872 1,694,392    
       
Total 73,688,664      
 
4. Estimation of votes in uncontested US House races 
 
Near complete election results were published shortly after November 7th for contested 
US House races.  Most media outlets do not publish the number of votes in 
uncontested House races, which can be substantial.  Public opinion and exit pollsters 
may sample voters in districts with uncontested candidates.  In order to have an 
accurate baseline for any measurements based on the actual US House vote, it was 
necessary to estimate the total number of votes cast for unopposed candidates. 
 
 To estimate the number of votes in US House races with unopposed candidates: 
• We identified jurisdictions, such as Florida, where uncontested candidates do not 
appear on the ballot at all.  These races were excluded from the national aggregate 
US House vote count. 
• For every other uncontested race we looked at historical data on ballots cast for 
uncontested candidates for a midterm election in exactly the same district.  In most 
cases, the same districts were uncontested in 2002. 
• In a few cases, districts with uncontested races in 2006 were not uncontested in 
recent elections.  For those districts, we used the winning margin of the candidate 
of the same party in a recent midterm election. 
• Our overall estimate of votes in uncontested elections –  2,525,125 votes cast 
nationwide for unopposed Democrats and 370,000 nationwide cast for unopposed 
Republicans – produces an estimated national grand total that matches quite 
closely the grand total vote that appears to have been used to calibrate the adjusted 
US House exit poll on November 8th. 
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Appendix 2 – NEP Methodology 2004 and 2007 
 
 
 
 
METHODS STATEMENT 
NATIONAL ELECTION POOL EXIT POLLS 
November 2, 2004 
NATIONAL/REGIONAL EXIT POLL 
Edison Media Research and Mitofsky International conducted exit polls in each state and nationally for 
the National Election Pool (ABC, AP, CBS, CNN, FOX, NEC). The polls should be referred to as a 
National Election Pool (or NEP) Exit Poll, conducted by Edison/Mitofsky. All questionnaires were 
prepared by NEP. 
The National exit poll was conducted at a sample of 250 polling places among 11,719 Election Day voters 
representative of the United States. 
In addition, 500 absentee and/or early voters in 13 states were interviewed in a pre-election telephone poll. 
Absentee or early voters were asked the same questions asked at the polling place on Election Day. The 
absentee results were combined in approximately the correct proportion with voters interviewed at the polling 
places. The states where absentee/early voters were interviewed for the National exit poll are: Arizona, 
California, Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, Tennessee, 
Texas and Washington state. Absentee voters in these states made up 13% of the total national vote in the 2000 
presidential election. Another 3% of the 2000 total vote was cast absentee in other states in 2000 and where 
there is no absentee/early voter telephone poll. 
The polling places were selected as a stratified probability sample of each state. A subsample of the state 
samples was selected at the proper proportions for the National exit poll. Within each polling place an 
interviewer approached every nth voter as he or she exited the polling place. Approximately 100 voters 
completed a questionnaire at each polling place. The exact number depends on voter turnout and their 
cooperation. 
For the national tabulations used to analyze an election, respondents are weighted based upon two factors. They 
are: (1) the probability of selection of the precinct and the respondent within the precinct; (2) by the size and 
distribution of the best estimate of the vote within geographic subregions of the nation. The second step 
produces consistent estimates at the time of the tabulation whether from the tabulations or an estimating model 
used to make an estimate of the national popular vote. At other times the estimated national popular vote may 
differ somewhat from the national tabulations. 
 
All samples are approximations. A measure of the approximation is called the sampling error. Sampling error is 
affected by the design of the sample, the characteristic being measured and the number of people who have the 
characteristic. If a characteristic is found in roughly the same proportions in all precincts the sampling error will 
be lower. If the characteristic is concentrated in a few precincts the sampling error will be larger. Gender would 
be a good example of a characteristic with a lower sampling error. Characteristics for minority racial groups 
will have larger sampling errors. 
The table below lists typical sampling errors for given size subgroups for a 95% confidence interval. The values 
in the table should be added and subtracted from the characteristic's percentage in order to construct an interval. 
95% of the intervals created this way will contain the value that would be obtained if all voters were 
interviewed using the same procedures. Other non-sampling factors, including nonresponse, are likely to 
increase the total error. 
%Error Due to Sampling (+/-) for 95% Confidence Interval 
 
Number of Voters in Base of Percentage 
 
% Voters with 
Characteristic 
100 
 
101-200 
 
201-500 
 
501-950
 
951-2350 
 
2351-5250
 
5251-8000 
 
8001-15000*
 
5% or 95% 6 5 3 2 2 1 1 1 
15% or 85% 11 7 5 4 3 2 1 1 
25% or 75% 13 9 6 5 3 2 2 1 
50% 15 10 7 5 4 3 2 1 
* chart bolding ours 
 
From National Election Pool FAQs 2007 
What is the Margin of Error for an exit poll? 
Every number estimated from a sample may depart from the official vote count. The 
difference between a sample result and the number one would get if everyone who cast a 
vote was interviewed in exactly the same way is called the sampling error. That does not 
mean the sample result is wrong. Instead, it refers to the potential error due to sampling. 
The margin of error for a 95% confidence interval is about +/- 3% for a typical 
characteristic from the national exit poll and +/-4% for a typical state exit 
poll.* Characteristics that are more concentrated in a few polling places, such as race, 
have larger sampling errors. Other nonsampling factors may increase the total error.  
* bolding ours
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Appendix 3 – Mechanics of Vote Manipulation 
 
 
Practical Constraints on any Nationwide Covert Vote Manipulation Capability 
 
Some critics of the initial draft of this paper released in November 2006 questioned 
whether it was possible that a systematic tabulation bias could ever be deployed to 
electronic voting equipment on a nationwide scale without being detected. Others 
claimed that if that capability truly existed, it should guarantee that one party would 
remain in permanent control.  
 
The technical and logistical challenges inherent in any attempt to secretly corrupt vote 
tabulation on a nationwide basis are of course hardly trivial, but expert consensus is that 
there are multiple credible methods.  We believe that the potential methods that could 
feasibly be used to implement widespread electronic vote manipulation on a national 
scale with a high probability of remaining undetected are such that a significant lead time 
would be required prior to the election.  There is therefore a risk that any unexpected late-
breaking pre-election developments could overcome a pre-programmed bias.   
 
Voting systems risk assessment 
 
Modern American electronic voting systems are geographically dispersed, distributed 
computer systems which are used intensively but infrequently. The end-to-end voting 
systems contain thousands of central tabulators and hundreds of thousands of in-precinct 
voting devices, all of which are purchased, maintained, upgraded, programmed, tested 
and used in actual elections in over 170,000 precincts across the United States on 
irregular schedules.  
 
Through hands-on access, individual voting machines can be compromised one at a time 
through a variety of well-documented exploits.32  But the sheer number of devices in use 
makes hands-on vote manipulation on a national scale a massively labor-intensive 
enterprise.  The more individuals that are involved, the greater the likelihood of 
disclosure. The very ability successfully to orchestrate the collective behavior of tens of 
thousands of devices to achieve a desired outcome—election after election, without being 
detected—would depend on minimizing the number of people involved and so would  
require a significant degree of sophistication. 
 
Undetected widespread vote count corruption would certainly be not only the greatest 
computer security exploit of all time, it would be the greatest—and, in terms of the 
ultimate stakes, most lucrative—undetected crime in history.  One must presume that any 
individuals capable of successfully pulling off such an exploit are clever, ruthless, and 
utterly determined to cover their tracks.  We would not expect them to display naiveté nor 
simplicity, but rather to act at every step to preserve total secrecy of their presence and 
activities. 
                                                 
32 See footnotes 16 – 22 on page 8 above. 
Page 22 of 24 
 
Voting system attacks that minimize the number of people involved 
 
The June 2006 Brennan Center report described in great detail precisely how software 
patches, ballot definition files, and memory cards could be used to enable just one 
individual to alter the outcome of an election conducted either on touchscreen DREs33 or 
on optical scan equipment.34
 
As the Brennan Center report notes: 
 
. . . [I]n a close statewide election . . . “retail” attacks, or attacks on individual polling places, 
would not likely affect enough votes to change the outcome. By contrast, the less difficult attacks 
are centralized attacks: these would occur against the entire voting system and allow an attacker to 
target many votes with few informed participants. 
 
Least difficult among these less difficult attacks would be attacks that use Software Attack 
Programs. The reason is relatively straightforward: a software attack allows a single 
knowledgeable person (or, in some cases, small group of people) to reach hundreds or thousands 
of machines. For instance, software updates and patches are often sent to jurisdictions throughout 
a state.  Similarly, replaceable media such as memory cards and ballot definition files are 
generally programmed at the county level (or at the vendor) and sent to every polling place in the 
county. 
 
These attacks have other benefits: unlike retail denial-of-service attacks, or manual shut off of 
machine functions, they could provide an attacker's favored candidate with a relatively certain 
benefit (i.e., addition of x number of votes per machine attacked). And if installed in a clever way, 
these attacks have a good chance of eluding the standard inspection and testing regimens currently 
in place.35
 
 
Long-term evasion of detection 
 
Since it is clear that the motivation exists to take covert control of electronic voting in the 
United States and that there are credible mechanisms for a small number of malicious 
insiders at voting equipment vendors to do so, long-term success boils down to evading 
detection—and so maintaining this power over time.  One critical element of maintaining 
long-term secrecy would be the tradeoff of carefully calibrating the degree of vote 
manipulation to avoid attracting suspicion, while also ensuring the desired political 
outcome. 
 
An individual in the position to introduce a covert vote manipulation software component 
into the operating system, firmware, device driver, or voting application itself would 
want to minimize risk of future detection and maximize the ease of changing the outcome 
of future contests.  Ideally covert vote manipulation logic itself should be built into the 
machine as close to the factory as possible, rather than requiring redistribution of 
                                                 
33 Brennan Center June 2006 Report : “The Machinery of Democracy: Protecting Elections in an Electronic 
World,” pp. 34 – 40. 
34 ibid, p. 78. 
35 ibid, p. 48. 
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malicious program logic every election cycle; any change to the logic of a complex 
system could introduce new errors into the behavior of “benign” tabulation logic. And 
since political circumstances change, not all contests, elections and machines would be 
subject to the same type and degree of vote manipulation in every election, or the 
existence of the “Trojan Horse” itself would become all too evident.  
 
Perhaps the easiest method to achieve both goals—long-term secrecy and long-term 
flexibility—is to introduce a general-purpose vote manipulation component which 
remains hidden within in the voting equipment for a long period of time, and which can 
be activated on demand by receipt of an external trigger.  The trigger would not only 
activate the malicious software, but would also contain a parameter defining the size of 
the manipulation to implement.  This is far from science fiction; parameterization is a 
basic computer software technique in use since the dawn of computing, and 
parameterization of voting equipment exploits is a powerful attack that is certainly 
technically feasible.36
 
Although of course we cannot know for certain in the absence of a proper investigation 
whether this was actually done in 2006, there is strong support for a hypothesis that the 
logistics of introducing malicious programming on a targeted nationwide basis is both 
technically feasible and would likely require a substantial lead time, necessitating 
deployment prior to this past October’s “perfect storm.”   
 
 
 
                                                 
36 ibid, p. 38. 
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